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What Washington may view as a temporary side issue often is seen as an existential 
matter in the capitals of other states. This is especially true about America’s relations 
with the emerging states of Eurasia, many of which have faced certain risks and 
heightened tensions with their much stronger neighbor in order to connect with the 
West.
Because these states see strategic partnerships as fundamental for maintaining and 
strengthening their independence and sovereignty, they are both staunchly committed 
to the choices they’ve made and constantly concerned about a possible weakening of 
the US commitment, particularly since such choices often have entailed major 
concessions and mutual trust. For instance, during the 1996 Vienna Conference on the 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, eleventh-hour brokering by US Vice 
President Al Gore brought about agrements from Azerbaijan and Moldova (despite their 
strong reservations) allowing for higher ceilings for Russia.
Concerns with a weaker-than-expected US commitment also explain in part why the 
pro-American euphoria of the early 1990s is on the wane. In Eurasia, it is not the US 
presence, but rather its insufficient level, that causes worry. At the same time, most 
Eurasian governments are trying to maintain a pragmatic balance in order to offset the 
still-dominant influence of the region’s major military power and former ruler, Russia. 
Their states’ viability depends on the success of these efforts.
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While the current intensification of the US-Russian dialogue and cooperation certainly 
can help to improve the region’s climate, some developments can be perceived as 
America sacrificing the interests of its partners in the region to obtain Moscow’s support 
on issues of immediate concern.
US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s recent remarks in Moscow provide a 
clear illustration. Quite unexpectedly, he acknowledged, in effect, Russia’s right to act 
preemptively against targets on the territory of neighboring Georgia. (1) Though 
possibly taken out of context, his words have had a serious effect. A casual remark by a 
traveling US official paying lip service to Russia, thus came across as indication of a 
change in policy towards the Caucasus. Compounding the problem was the fact that the 
comment was made by a person known to be among Washington’s most 
knowledgeable experts on the region.
Russia’s support in the war against Iraq, undoubtedly, would be valuable. Yet, how far 
should the US go to obtain such support? Washington’s compromise — real or 
perceived — of its unequivocal support for the hard-won independence of countries in 
Eurasia could very well undermine its long-term interests in the region. Paradoxically, 
this is happening as the United States is expanding actual cooperation with its regional 
partners. Such a dichotomy between real policies and perceptions is unnecessary, 
counterproductive and avoidable.
Whatever the context of Armitage’s words, they should not have been uttered. Whether 
Georgian authorities need to put their house in order or the Russian government needs 
some encouragement in order to side with the Bush Administration, one thing is clear: 
High-level US officials must maintain that uninvited interference into a neighbor’s 
territory will not be tolerated.
The Moscow-based media have, by and large, interpreted Armitage’s remarks as a 
carte blanche for Russia in exchange for supporting the United States elsewhere. This 
not only emboldens some "imperial" circles in Moscow but also pressures governments 
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in Eurasia to be more accommodating to Russian demands. As a result, one can expect 
increasingly rigorous attempts to reassert Russia’s influence and to weaken sovereign 
decision-making in neighboring states. Ironically, having survived blatant military and 
economic pressures, coup attempts and separatist conflicts, the emerging republics of 
Eurasia finally had appeared to be winning Moscow’s respect for their independence. 
Both America’s support and the strategic choices made by the regional leaders have 
contributed to that. Now Washington’s preoccupation with Iraq and its propensity to 
accommodate Moscow may undercut these successes. America’s visible, extensive 
presence is crucial to ensure the region’s continuous transition in the right direction.
Following the outrage of September 11, the United States decisively pursued clearly 
defined interests in Eurasia, capitalized on the unprecedented level of international 
support and significantly raised its presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The 
Bush Administration even waived the infamous Section 907 of the Freedom Support 
Act. (2) Not only did America’s new decisiveness encourage a greater degree of 
cooperation from its friends; it also demonstrated that reliable longer-term partnerships 
based on common interests ensure success. America’s strong commitment alone 
reduces the need for a trade-off and, as was the case in Central Asia, raises the 
question whether an arrangement with Russia is necessary given the support from other 
states in the region.
That there might be no real need for a trade-off came as a revelation for many. While 
Russia’s legitimate interests must be addressed, individual partnerships among 
independent neighbors should not require Moscow’s seal of approval. It is possible that 
the rhetoric about the necessity of Russia’s involvement was meant to address Russian 
anxieties. However, at least symbolically, such rhetoric contributes greatly to public 
anxieties elsewhere in Eurasia.
In the early 1990s, individuals in the Caucasus followed the high-level Russian-
American meetings with some concern, fearful lest Washington and Moscow agree to 
something that would harm Russia’s neighbors. Indeed, many persons accustomed to 
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the Soviet mindset perceived more than coincident timing between summits and such 
activity as, for example, major advances of the Russian-backed Armenian forces in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Those fears were assuaged somewhat as Russia, in spite 
of all its posturing, began recognizing that neighboring states grew increasingly 
independent and adopting a less antagonistic approach to Western investment in 
Eurasia. The biggest danger now lies in ignoring the progress made and encouraging 
the revival of the counterproductive old-time perceptions.
Moreover, it is important to make the case that a stable not achievable through bullying 
but rather through cooperation. The improvement of the Turkish-Russian relations, 
which was contingent on Moscow overcoming its antagonism to Ankara, clearly has 
been beneficial to both sides. A more stable and confident Azerbaijan has been 
cooperating broadly with Russia, building a normal neighborly relationship. If anything, 
Moscow’s previous attempts to coerce its neighbors has been the major reason for 
resentment and its diminishing presence in the area. The people of Azerbaijan, for 
instance, resent Moscow’s military support for the Armenian occupation of 20% of the 
country and the displacement of 1 million Azerbaijanis from their homes; they do not rail 
against Russian goods in shops, or the presence of Russian companies or culture. 
Every January, Azerbaijanis remember the mass murder of Baku civilians by Soviet 
(mostly Russian) troops in 1990. Every February 26, they commemorate the massacre 
of Khojaly, during which Armenian forces (with the direct participation of Russian troops) 
slaughtered hundreds of individuals. Such actions have damaged Russia’s own 
interests in the region. Its brute pressure on Georgia may just follow the same pattern.
The best way to address Russia’s interests is by continuously encouraging Moscow to 
respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of its neighbors. The 
United States is in a unique position to do so.
America’s engagement in the region is welcomed because it is seen as a result of a 
principled policy. Whatever the motivation, Washington’s indulgence of Armenia’s self-
destructive ethnic expansionism and Russia’s murderous actions in Chechnya does not 
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serve America’s long-term interests. Indeed, inconsistency leads regional leaders to be 
more cautious in their relations with Washington, thus slowing the transition of the entire 
Eurasian region.
(1) Ekho Moskvy, 23 January 2003.
(2) Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which was enacted by Congress in 1992 
under pressure from the Armenian-American lobby, had prohibited US assistance to the 
newly independent government of Azerbaijan. President George W. Bush waived 
Section 907 in order to facilitate greater US-Azerbaijan security cooperation.
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